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The degree to which people construe their perceived self as independent from or inter-
dependent with their social environment can vary.We tested whether the current degree
of social self-construal predicts the degree to which individuals integrate others into their
self-concept. Participants worked through tasks that drew attention to either personal inter-
dependence (e.g., by instructing participants to circle all relational pronouns in a text, such
as “we,” “our,” or “us”) or independence (by having them to circle pronouns such as “I,”
“my,” or “me”) and were compared with respect to the social Simon effect (SSE) – an
index of the degree to which people co-represent the actions of a co-actor. As predicted,
the SSE was more pronounced in the interdependence group than in the independence
group, suggesting that self-other integration varies dynamically as a function of the relative
saliency of the other.
Keywords: self-construal priming, SSE, self-other integration
INTRODUCTION
Western societies take it commonly for granted that people own
some sort of “self,” a concept that refers to the phenomenal and
social identity of a person over time and his/her responsibility for
his/her actions. Eastern cultures are often more skeptical; e.g., Bud-
dhism considers the self as only apparent and seeks to overcome
it through systematic mental training (the anatta doctrine). Even
though there is no agreed-upon definition of the concept (Neisser,
1988), authors often distinguish between what has been called the
“minimal self” (Gallagher, 2000) and the “narrative/diachronic
self” (Dennett, 1992). While the latter refers to the social iden-
tity people construct by actively creating their (ideally coherent)
autobiography, the former refers, among other things, to the phe-
nomenal experience that one has a body that is different from
others’ and that can be employed to actively change one’s environ-
ment. How much that experience is fueled by, and thus depending
on self-perception has been emphasized by Hume (1739/1978, p.
252):“when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold,
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure,”an observation that
led Hume to conceptualize the self as a bundle of perceptions (a
construction that roughly corresponds to James’ concept of “me”;
James, 1890). Hence, the cognitive system may represent oneself
as just another event, that is, as an integrated network of codes
representing one’s own perceptual features (Hommel et al., 2009).
Along the same line, very recently, it has been shown that Buddhist
practice, which is assumed to “remove the barriers between one-
self and others” (Dogen, 1976, p. 39), which should lead to a loss
of discrimination between the representation of oneself and the
representations of others, enhances self-other integration (Colzato
et al., 2012).
The present study tested whether the degree of self-other inte-
gration is not only determined by such slow learning processes
but also depends on more situational, dynamic factors. Previous
research suggests that the degree to which individuals perceive
themselves as dependent on, or independent from their social
environment might vary rather quickly. For instance, Kühnen and
Oyserman (2002) showed that having participants to circle all rela-
tional pronouns in a text, such as “we,” “our,” or “us,” induces a
global, context-sensitive processing strategy, while having them
to circle pronouns referring to the self independent from oth-
ers, such as “I,” “my,” or “me,” induces a local, context-insensitive
processing strategy. Even though this observation does not prove
that priming can produce long-lasting modifications of the basic
structure of self-perception, it does suggest that task and context
can temporarily affect people’s attention in such a way that they
perceive themselves either as a part of a social context (as interde-
pendent) or more in isolation (as independent). If so, one would
expect that interdependence priming would lead them to integrate
others into their own self-concept to a greater degree than inde-
pendence priming. We assessed this hypothesis by testing whether
self-construal priming modulates the social Simon effect (SSE;
Sebanz et al., 2003).
The classical Simon effect shows that left and right actions are
carried out faster if they spatially correspond to the stimulus sig-
naling them (Simon, 1969). Recent studies revealed that this is
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the case even when the two actions are carried out by different
people (i.e., the SSE), which has been taken to imply that task rep-
resentations are socially shared (for overviews, see Sebanz et al.,
2006). Very recently Hommel and colleagues (2009) provided evi-
dence that the SSE occurs only if actor and co-actor are involved in
a positive relationship (induced by a friendly acting, cooperative
confederate) but not if they are involved in a negative relationship
(induced by an intimidating, competitive confederate). Hence, the
mere presence of another person is insufficient for the SSE to occur
if this person is not involved in the task (Sebanz et al., 2003) or is
perceived as intimidating and unfriendly (Hommel et al., 2009).
This suggests that people consider the other person’s action in
their own representation of the current task and that the SSE can
be considered to indicate the degree to which the participant has
integrated another person’s actions into his or her own task rep-
resentation (Sebanz et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2009). If drawing
people’s attention to personal interdependence or independence
affects the degree to which people integrate others into their own
self-concept, one would expect a more pronounced SSE with the
former than with the latter.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Forty-four healthy young adults, with a mean age of 22.5 years
(SD= 2.4, range 18–30), participated for partial fulfillment of
course credit or a financial reward. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants after a detailed explanation of the
study procedures. The protocol was approved by the local ethical
committee (Leiden University, Faculty of Social and Behavioral
Sciences).
In the social Simon task participants made speeded discrimina-
tive responses to the color (green or blue) of circles by pressing one
of two keys while the other key was operated by another participant
(see Figure 1). Circles (diameter of 43 pixels) were equiprobably
presented to the left or right (at a distance of 50 pixels) of a central
fixation point (12 pixels) until the response was given or 1,500 ms
has passed. Intervals between subsequent stimuli varied randomly
but equiprobably, from 1750–2250 ms in steps of 100 ms. Partici-
pants were to ignore the location of the stimulus and to base their
response exclusively on its color. Responses were to be given as
FIGURE 1 | Setting in the social Simon task: the task was distributed
among two individuals. Each person responded to only one of the two
colors.
fast as possible while keeping error rates below 15% on average;
feedback about general speed (averaged between the RT of the
two participants) was provided at the end of a trial block. The task
consisted of one practice 60-trial block and three experimental
60-trial blocks. Just like in the original version of the task (Sebanz
et al., 2003), the participants sat next to each other, attended to the
same screen, and responded both with their dominant hand.
Eleven pairs of participants, randomly determined, were asked
to constantly switch between circling the independent (e.g., I,
mine) pronouns in an essay for 2 min (independent self-construal
priming) and completing a block of the social Simon task. The
other 11 pairs of participants constantly switched between circling
the interdependent (e.g., we, ours) pronouns in an essay for 2 min
(interdependent self-construal priming) and performing a block
of the social Simon task. Given that the experiment was composed
of one practice and three experimental blocks, participants were
to switch between the prime and the probe task four times in total.
Participants were naïve to the experiment. When debriefed after
the study, all participants thought that the study was about coop-
eration. None pointed out the possible relation between the social
Simon task and the fact they had to circle the relational pronouns.
RESULTS
A significance level of p< 0.05 was adopted for all tests. Mean reac-
tion times (RTs) from correct trials and error rates were analyzed
by means of ANOVAs as a function of Priming Group (indepen-
dence vs. interdependence) as between-participants factor and
spatial stimulus-response Correspondence (correspondence vs.
non-correspondence) as within-participants factor.
The reaction time analysis showed no evidence of a group effect,
F< 1, but a main effect of correspondence, F (1, 42)= 40.19,
p< 0.001, MSE= 50.777, η2p = 0.49, indicated that responses
were generally faster with stimulus-response correspondence
than with non-correspondence (322 vs. 332 ms). More impor-
tantly, a significant interaction indicated that the correspondence
effect on RT differed between groups, F(1,42)= 4.65, p= 0.037,
MSE= 50.777, η2p = 0.10, Even though the correspondence effect
was reliable in both, the interdependence, F(1,21)= 40.31,
p< 0.001, MSE= 45.472, η2p = 0.66, and the independence group,
F(1,21)= 7.91, p= 0.010, MSE= 56.083, η2p = 0.25, the SSE was
significantly more pronounced in the interdependence group (see
Figure 2). Moreover, follow-up analyses showed that the two
groups did not differ in the corresponding trials and that the size
of SSE did not change over time adding block as additional factor
in the ANOVAs, F’s< 1.
Overall, error percentages on corresponding trials (0.06%) and
non-corresponding trials (0.1%) were comparable and did not
differ between Groups (F’s< 1).
DISCUSSION
As expected, the SSE was more pronounced in the interdependence
group than in the independence group. This finding suggests that
having people work through tasks that draw attention to either per-
sonal interdependence or personal independence affects the degree
to which people integrate other people with their own self-concept.
Hommel et al. (2009) suggested the Theory of Event Coding
(TEC; Hommel et al., 2001) as theoretical framework to explain
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FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction time as a function of group (Independent vs.
Interdependent) and spatial stimulus-response (S-R) correspondence.
Error bars show standard errors of the means.
the mechanism underlying the SSE. TEC assumes that both per-
ceived events and produced events (i.e., actions) are cognitively
represented by codes of their perceptual features (such as color
and shape of objects, the sensory feedback and affective conse-
quences of actions, etc.). Along these lines, other people can be
considered as just another type of event, which would be cog-
nitively represented by codes of the features that describe what
the given individual looks like, which perceivable action effects he
or she is currently producing, which affective states are triggered
by this person, and so forth. And the same would hold for the
perceiving person him- or herself: one might represent oneself,
including one’s body parts, just as any other event and code one-
self in terms of one’s perceptual attributes and perceivable action
effects. Self-other integration is, then, assumed to be a function of
the overlap between the features bound to, and thus constituting
self and other.
From this perspective, independence priming along the lines
of Kühnen and Oyserman (2002) might be expected to operate
by drawing attention to features that distinguish between me and
other, while interdependence priming would draw attention to
features that me and other are sharing. As suggested by Hume’s
(1739/1978) bundle theory of the self, self-perception (i.e., the
current construal of one’s minimal self) would not only be a
function of the stimulus features characterizing me and other but
also by the attentional weight each feature receives. Accordingly,
weighting shared features more strongly would increase the per-
ceived overlap between me and other while a stronger weighting of
discriminating features would decrease the overlap. As suggested
by Hommel et al. (2009), greater me-other overlap will increase
the likelihood that the action of the other is considered in one’s
own task representation, which again increases the SSE.
What might be the mechanism responsible for this increase?
There is increasing evidence that the SSE is sensitive to both social
and non-social factors. For instance, Dolk et al. (2011, submitted)
and Dittrich et al. (2012) showed that even non-social events can
produce an SSE if they are sufficiently salient. And this is indeed
what our theoretical framework suggests: social and non-social
events are represented alike, even though there is evidence that
social events are more salient and attract more attention (e.g.,
Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Langton and Bruce, 2000). Dolk
et al. (2011, submitted) suggest that the presence of another salient
event in addition to the participant’s own action induces uncer-
tainty about agency, that is, it is no longer clear which of the two
events is representing the participant’s own action. Resolving this
uncertainty requires the emphasis on features that discriminate
between the action of the participant and the action of the co-actor.
The most obvious and most salient feature in the standard task set-
up is relative location (Guagnano et al., 2010), which means that
participants will attend more to, and code more strongly the loca-
tion of their response (relative to the response of the other), thus
creating the SSE. From this perspective, increasing self-other over-
lap (as by means of interdependence priming) is not the only way
to increase the SSE but a particularly effective one.
With regard to cultural variations in the degree of self-other
integration, our findings would be consistent with the assump-
tion that culture-specific reward schedules operate on developing
individuals. As we have argued elsewhere (Hommel and Colzato,
2010), individuals are likely to acquire preferences for particular
control styles through selective reward from their peers. In particu-
lar, perceptual, attentional, and action-related processes are under
the control of executive functions that specify control parameters
(such as speed vs. accuracy, local vs. global processing, or inclu-
sive vs. exclusive decision-making; see Logan and Gordon, 2001;
Hommel, 2012), and it makes sense to assume that social reward
can bias individuals toward particular ranges of parameter values
(Hommel and Colzato, 2010; Hommel et al., 2011). Even though
these biases or default values would be acquired in social situa-
tions, they are likely to generalize to any situation that is affected
by the same executive control function. This would explain why
the preference for a high degree of self-other integration in Asian
cultures comes along with a more pronounced tendency for inte-
gration in non-social perceptual tasks (Boduroglu et al., 2009) and
in Social Simon tasks (Colzato et al., 2012).
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